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INTRODUCTION
Joy Szabo, pregnant with her fourth child, planned to give birth
at her local hospital, as she had done with her first three children.1
However, just a few months short of her due date, her doctor informed
her that due to a recent change in the hospital’s policies, she would
have to schedule a cesarean. During her second pregnancy, Joy had a
placental abruption and an emergency cesarean. Although she had a
successful vaginal birth with her third pregnancy, the hospital is one
of hundreds of hospitals that prohibit vaginal birth after cesarean
(VBAC),2 and their new policy would require her to have a medically
unnecessary3 cesarean that she did not want.
* J.D., University of the District of Columbia, 2010; B.S. Florida State University,
2007. I would like to thank Sarah Gareau for her assistance designing the birth center
survey and Laura Possessky for her comments and support on this Article.
1. Joy Szabo, Mother-Sized Activism: Page Hospital VBAC Ban, ICAN BLOG (Oct. 2,
2009), http://blog.ican-online.org/2009/10/02/mother-sized-vbac-ban/.
2. VBAC (pronounced VEE-Back) is the term commonly used to describe a vaginal
birth or an attempt to have a vaginal birth after cesarean section. NANCY WAINER COHEN
& LOIS J. ESTNER, SILENT KNIFE: CESAREAN PREVENTION AND VAGINAL BIRTH AFTER
CESAREAN (VBAC) 4 (1983). In medical literature, where the distinction matters, an at-
tempt to VBAC is often referred to as a “Trial of Labor after Cesarean” (TOLAC), and the
term VBAC is limited to successful VBAC attempts. F. Gary Cunningham et al., National
Institutes of Health Consensus Development Conference Statement on Vaginal Birth After
Cesarean: New Insights March 8–10, 2010, 115 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1279, 1280
(2010) [hereinafter NIH VBAC Consensus Conference], available at http://consensus.nih
.gov/2010/images/vbac/vbac_statement.pdf. Women anticipating a vaginal birth do not gen-
erally refer to their labor as a “trial of labor.” In recognition of this and for continuity
throughout this document only the term VBAC is used.
3. Szabo, supra note 1.
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Although Joy’s story made national headlines, it is not unique.4
There has been a decline in the availability of access to VBAC; fear of
legal liability is the most often-cited reason.5 In 2010, the National
Institutes of Health (NIH) convened a Consensus Development Con-
ference on Vaginal Birth After Cesarean. The NIH concluded, and
the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG)
agreed, that VBAC is a safe option and should be offered to women.6
Despite the medical consensus, VBAC remains a limited option, both
in-hospital and outside of the hospital.7 Joy was lucky she had the
resources available to travel to another hospital.8 Women who do not
have these resources are forced to choose to either have the surgery
or go without care.9
Even when money is not a factor, women seeking VBAC fre-
quently have no medical options because of increasingly restrictive,
voluntary hospital policies and legislative requirements.10 Currently,
approximately thirty percent of U.S. hospitals have policies that pro-
hibit VBAC.11 Moreover, women who seek alternatives discover that
they are also not able to give birth at home or in a birth center, due to
state laws and regulations that restrict care providers from legally at-
tending to women who have had a prior cesarean.12 Despite the widely
4. Elizabeth Cohen, Mom Fights, Gets the Delivery She Wants, CNN (Dec. 17, 2009),
http://www.cnn.com/2009/HEALTH/12/17/birth.plan.tips/index.html.
5. Michael L. Socol & Donna K. Socol, How Do We Deal With the Legal Risks, 55
CLINICAL OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY 1014, 1015 (2012) (citing a recent survey of obste-
tricians that showed 25.9 percent had stopped offering VBAC because of fear of litigation).
6. Cunningham, supra note 2, at 1290 (“[T]he woman’s preference should be hon-
ored”); Vaginal Birth after Previous Cesarean Delivery, PRACTICE BULLETIN: THE AM. C.
OF OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS, Aug. 2010, at 7 (“[T]he ultimate decision to un-
dergo TOLAC or a repeat cesarean delivery should be made by the patient.”).
7. VBAC Policies in U.S. Hospitals, INT. CESAREAN AWARENESS NETWORK (ICAN),
http://www.ican-online.org/vbac-ban-info (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) [hereinafter ICAN
Hospital Survey].
8. In an interview with ICAN, Joy estimates the cost to travel to another city for her
birth was more than $1,500. Joy Szabo, Don’t Roll Over and Take It, ICAN BLOG (Dec. 18,
2009), http://blog.ican-online.org/2009/12/18/joy-szabo-dont-roll-over-and-take-it/.
9. Rixa Ann Spencer Freeze, Born Free: Unassisted Childbirth in North America 273
(Dec. 2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa), available at http://ir
.uiowa.edu/etd/202 (“Some unassisted births would not occur if certain obstacles were
eliminated, such as VBAC bans, restrictive hospital practices, [and] prohibition of home
birth midwifery . . . .”).
10. Rita Rubin, Battle Lines Drawn Over C-Sections, USA TODAY (Aug. 23, 2005), http://
usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2005-08-23-csection-battle_x.htm.
11. See ICAN Hospital Survey, supra note 7.
12. Marian F. MacDorman et al., Trends and Characteristics of Home Vaginal Birth
After Cesarean Delivery in the United States and Selected States, 119 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 737, 741 (2012) (stating an increase in the number of VBACs in home birth
and a decrease in hospital VBAC is likely attributable to women choosing alternative care
due to hospital restrictions, and acknowledging that home birth VBAC is still rare).
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accepted knowledge that VBAC is medically safe and viable,13 women
who have had a prior cesarean are often excluded from any meaning-
ful care options, forcing them to either consent to an unwanted and
unnecessary surgery or forgo prenatal and delivery care altogether.14
When hospitals adopt policies that prohibit VBAC and state laws
restrict VBAC at home or in a birth center, women and their fetuses
are placed at an unnecessary risk.15 Eliminating patient choice at
labor and delivery also means that women are forced out of the mater-
nity care delivery system; in most instances the provider who handles
the delivery also provides prenatal and postnatal care.16 When a
woman endeavors to do what she believes is in her and the fetus’s best
interest, she must either globally opt in or opt out of medical care,
even if that is not in her best interest.
This dilemma should be a staggering public health concern. One-
third of women who give birth will deliver by cesarean, precluding
more than one million women annually from most birth options be-
cause of laws and policies that prohibit VBAC.17 Certain minority pop-
ulations are disparately impacted because of their disproportionately
higher than average cesarean rate.18
When a hospital refuses to allow VBAC, the hospital has not elim-
inated one risky delivery method for a risk-free method.19 In light of
this consideration, a pregnant woman should be the one determining
which set of risks are acceptable.20 Part I of this Article will discuss
the history of VBAC and the emergence of VBAC bans, examine the
13. PRACTICE BULLETIN, supra note 6, at 8.
14. MacDorman, supra note 12, at 741.
15. Carol Sakala et al., Maternity Care and Liability: Pressing Problems, Substantive
Solutions, CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION 34 (2013), available at http://transform.childbirth
connection.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Maternity-Care-and-Liability.pdf (explaining
the practice of defensive medicine harms patients and limits access).
16. Freeze, supra note 9, at 25.
17. Why You Don’t Want a C-Section, FIT PREGNANCY, http://www.fitpregnancy.com
/pregnancy/labor-delivery/why-you-dont-want-c-section (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
18. Bonnie Rochman, C-Sections on the Rise, Especially for Black Moms, TIME
(Dec. 20, 2010), http://healthland.time.com/2010/12/20/c-sections-on-the-rise-especially-for
-black-moms/.
19. The purpose of this Article is not to argue the pros and cons of which delivery
method is safer or should be preferred. Unfortunately, there is no risk-free method of child-
birth; both vaginal birth and surgical births carry risk to both mother and fetus. NIH VBAC
Consensus Conference, supra note 2 (follow hyperlink Archived Webcasts Day 1 and
Day 2) (demonstrating there are risks and benefits to both a planned cesarean and a
planned vaginal birth, and concluding the patient’s preferences should be honored).
20. Anne Drapkin Lyerly & Margaret Olivia Little, Toward an Ethically Responsible
Approach to Vaginal Birth After Cesarean, 34 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY 337, 338 (2010)
(“[M]any of the trade-offs have to do with extramedical, highly qualitative considerations
about the process of birth, which are often poorly captured by traditional measures or risk-
benefit analyses.”).
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medical research, and review the relevant legal framework. Part II
will present how voluntary policies and laws restrict access to VBAC.
Part III will explore the impact the restrictions have on women.
I. THE RISE AND FALL OF VBAC
The motivation to prohibit VBAC in hospitals stems from a fear
of legal liability, rather than a concern for patient safety.21 Prohibiting
access to care for women who desire a VBAC, either in the hospital or
outside of the hospital, is not supported by public policy,22 current
medical research,23 or legal precedent.24
A. The History of the VBAC Movement
Cesareans were once regarded as a life-saving measure for the
fetus when the mother’s demise was imminent.25 As advances were
made in surgical technology, coupled with the use of blood products
and increased knowledge about sanitation, the procedure was able to
be performed without taking the mother’s life.26 The phrase “once a
cesarean always a cesarean” was commonly used prior to the 1970s,
when cesarean sections were a very rare occurrence.27 In the 1980s,
after research demonstrated a low rate of complications, hospitals
started offering VBAC in response to concerns over the rising cesar-
ean rate and to increased consumer demand.28 Eventually, insurance
companies, concerned about the high cost of cesareans, required
women who had previously delivered by cesarean to deliver by VBAC
in subsequent deliveries, regardless of individual risk factors.29 Conse-
quently, women were not given true informed consent on the risks of
VBAC, and those who suffered adverse outcomes brought malpractice
claims against the doctors and hospitals.30 In response to an increased
malpractice climate, ACOG released more restrictive VBAC guidelines
in 1999, stating the circumstances under which women should be
21. Lisa L. Chalidze, Misinformed Consent: Non-Medical Bases for American Birth
Recommendations as a Human Rights Issue, 54 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 59, 82, 100 (2009).
22. Id. at 73.
23. Id. at 75.
24. Id. at 78.
25. COHEN & ESTNER, supra note 2, at 10; Clarissa Bonanno et al., VBAC: A Medicolegal
Perspective, 38 CLINICAL PERINATOLOGY 217, 217–18 (2011) [hereinafter VBAC History]
(giving a brief history of cesareans and VBAC).
26. Id.
27. VBAC History, supra note 25.
28. COHEN & ESTNER, supra note 2, at 21.
29. VBAC History, supra note 25, at 219.
30. Id. at 221.
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offered a VBAC, including having anesthesia immediately available.31
Concerned with the ability to meet the new guidelines, hospitals grad-
ually stopped offering VBAC, until the VBAC rate dropped to 8.5 per-
cent in 2006, an all-time low.32
During this time, many states were passing licensing laws for
midwives who attended home births. Many of these laws prohibited
the midwife from attending VBACs at home, or created restrictions on
the circumstances under which the midwife could attend a VBAC at
home.33 Additionally, birth centers, which were a relatively new con-
cept in maternity care delivery, were also being licensed by some
states and, in some instances, prohibited from attending VBACs.34
Some birth centers, like some hospitals, were also electing not to offer
VBACs even if they were not prohibited by law from doing so.35
Policies that force women to have a repeat cesarean section carry
the echoes of the old mandatory VBAC policies. Once again women are
not being told of the risks,36 this time the risks of cesarean section, and
they are not being given the opportunity to refuse the procedure.37
Moreover, women are not able to seek alternative care outside of a
hospital setting due to state laws prohibiting VBACs at home or in
birth centers.38
B. Current Medical Research on the Safety of VBAC
In 2010, NIH held a consensus conference on the medical research
for VBAC. That conference presented information that cesareans car-
ried more risk to the mother, but that a vaginal birth carried more
31. Id. at 218.
32. Id.
33. There are two different types of midwives in the United States: direct-entry mid-
wives and Certified Nurse-Midwives. A Certified Nurse-Midwife (CNM) is a midwife who
obtained a nursing degree and then a Masters degree in midwifery. Direct-entry midwives
do not possess a nursing degree or license; instead they attend midwifery training from a
direct-entry midwifery school or through an apprenticeship. There is not a consistent title
or credential for direct entry midwives. Each state establishes their own nomenclature:
Certified Professional Midwife, Registered Midwife, Certified Midwife, Licensed Midwife,
Lay Midwife, or Direct-Entry Midwife. MIDWIVES ALLIANCE NORTH AM., What is a
Midwife?, http://www.mana.org/about-midwives/what-is-a-midwife (last visited Nov. 3,
2013) (explaining the different types of midwives); The Push Chart, THE BIG PUSH FOR
MIDWIVES CAMPAIGN (May 17, 2013), http://pushformidwives.org/2012/04/29/pushchart/
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (showing what year each state passed legislation to license direct
entry midwives); see also infra Section II.B.
34. NANCY WAINER COHEN, OPEN SEASON, A SURVIVAL GUIDE FOR NATURAL CHILDBIRTH
AND VBAC IN THE 90S, at 195 (Bergin & Garvey 1991).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 312.
37. Rubin, supra note 10, at 4.
38. See infra Section II, discussing decreased access in home and birth center settings.
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risks for the fetus.39 In either situation, the panel concluded that the
risks were still incredibly small, and that VBAC was an option women
should be offered.40 Furthermore, in evaluating safety considerations,
the panel concluded that one cannot make a decision on whether to
have a VBAC based only on the risks and benefits of having a vaginal
birth; one must also evaluate the short and long term risks and ben-
efits of a repeat cesarean.41 The risks associated with a VBAC are sim-
ilar to risks of any first-time birth.42 The only major increased risk is
uterine rupture.43 However, the increase is very small at less than one
percent in women who have a low transverse scar.44 Even at the
higher risks, there is still a ninety-nine percent chance that her uterus
will not tear.45 Research on the outcomes for cesarean surgery in gen-
eral, and repeat cesareans specifically, do show a decreased risk of
uterine rupture, but rupture is not the only outcome consideration.46
Babies born by cesarean spend more time in the NICU, and have
other long term complications, such as asthma.47 Each delivery option
has risks and benefits, and women will choose different risks to accept,
but that determination should be made by the woman whose life,
health, and baby will be affected, not by hospital policies.
C. Legal Framework
The question of whether a woman has the right to decline cesar-
ean surgery may be addressed through long-standing legal doctrines
concerning patients’ rights. Deeply rooted in common law, a competent
individual has the right to refuse any or all unwanted medical treat-
ment, even life-saving treatment.48 Further, the doctrine of informed
39. NIH VBAC Consensus Conference, supra note 2, at 1283, 1286 (showing the death
rate for women from VBAC is 4 per 100,000 and from cesarean is 13 per 100,000, but
for the fetus the death rate from VBAC is 130 per 100,000 and from cesarean is 50
per 100,000).
40. Id. at 1289–90.
41. Id. at 1290.
42. Id.
43. JENNIFER BLOCK, PUSHED 116 (2007). A “uterine rupture” is a tear in the uterus. It
is a life-threatening complication to both the mother and fetus. Uterine rupture can occur
in any vaginal delivery, not just after a prior cesarean.
44. NIH VBAC Consensus Conference, supra note 2 (showing rupture rate is less than
one percent).
45. Id.
46. See Lyerly & Little, supra note 20.
47. NIH VBAC Consensus Conference, supra note 2.
48. “No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law,
than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law.”
Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891); “Every human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body; and
a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for
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consent, and the corollary doctrine of informed refusal, bolster this
right by providing a patient with the information on which to base
her treatment decisions, after being informed of the risks and bene-
fits, as well as the alternatives to the proposed treatment.49 Addi-
tionally, established doctrine states that one cannot be compelled to
undergo treatment for the benefit of a third party,50 and that there
are limits on whether a hospital or physician may force a woman to
undergo a cesarean. Finally, case law clearly supports the premise
that pregnancy does not void a woman’s constitutional right to make
her own treatment decisions, nor does it diminish her right to in-
formed consent.51
Some would suggest that pregnancy is a special circumstance that
involves two patients, both of whom possess equal rights and equal
consideration with regard to a decision to pursue a VBAC.52 However,
this special category of personhood cannot logically or legally support
forced cesarean. In order for the fetus to receive treatment, in this case
a surgical delivery, one must cut through the woman’s body, compel-
ling her to submit to treatment that benefits a third party, the fetus,
and to address the rights of the fetus, it must invariably mean ad-
dressing the individual rights of the woman. Certainly a fetus has an
interest in what delivery options the woman chooses. However, those
interests do not trump the woman’s rights.53
Whether to perceive the mother and baby as two separate pa-
tients or as one does not change the analysis. First, if the mother and
baby are indeed two separate patients, the mother has the right to not
which he is liable in damages.” Schloendorff v. Soc’y of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914); Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990).
49. Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-
Ordered Cesareans, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1951, 1970 (1986) (“[I]nformed consent doctrine illus-
trates two salient features of American law. First, it shows the extent to which patient
autonomy is respected and highlights how nonconsensual surgery deviates sharply from
[that and] it shows that risk-benefit judgments about medical treatment are the patient’s
to make, and not the doctor’s . . . . The informed consent requirement would be meaningless
if patients had no choice but to obey doctors’ orders.”).
50. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D.& C.3d 90, 91 (1978) (considering if Shimp should be com-
pelled to give life sustaining bone marrow to his cousin, the court stated, “one human being
is under no legal compulsion to give aid or to take action to save that human being or
to rescue.”).
51. In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1244, 1247 (D.C. 1990), rev’d en banc, 533 A.2d 611
(D.C. 1987).
52. Margo Kaplan, A “Special Class of Persons”: Pregnant Women’s Right to Refuse
Medical Treatment After Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 PA. J. CONST. L. 145, 192 (2010). Judge
Belson’s dissent in the In re A.C. case describes pregnant women as a “unique category of
persons.” Id.
53. Elselijn Kingma, The Lancet’s Risky Ideas: Rights, Interests, and Home Birth, 65
INT. J. OF CLINICAL PRAC. 918, 919 (2011) (distinguishing between “rights” and “interests”
in birth).
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be compelled to undergo treatment for a third party, in this case the
fetus. Because of doctrine governing patient refusals, she has the right
to refuse the surgery, even if it poses a greater risk to the fetus. If,
alternatively, the mother and baby are considered one patient, the
mother decides for herself what treatment to refuse or accept. The
decision whether to attempt a VBAC rests solely with the mother.
Finally, it is important to note that attempting a VBAC is not a
de facto abortion and cases that attempt to apply abortion case law to
compel a cesarean are misplaced.54 In the situation where a woman
contests a hospital or doctor’s determination to prohibit VBAC, the
mother is disagreeing with the doctor on the manner in which to de-
liver the baby. There is no reason to believe that she intends to termi-
nate the pregnancy or to terminate the potential life of the fetus prior
to delivery.55
Any legal theory that presumes the maternal choice to pursue a
VBAC involves harm to the fetus, or even a competition of interests
between mother and fetus, is flawed. This comparison assumes that
VBAC is inherently risky, so much so, that the likelihood of death or
harm to the fetus is almost certain, but the medical literature does not
support this assertion.56
II. LAWS AND POLICIES THAT RESTRICT VBAC
There have been several student written articles on possible legal
challenges to hospital policies that prohibit VBAC, however none
have examined the lack of access outside of a hospital.57 This is an
54. Rhoden, supra note 49, at 1953 (“Roe merely allows states to prohibit intentional
fetal destruction after viability, unless abortion is needed to protect the woman’s life . . . .
It says nothing about whether the state may require invasive medical procedures to pro-
mote fetal health.”).
55. Kaplan, supra note 52, at 169–70 (“One of the limitations of applying abortion juris-
prudence to compelled treatment is that the state interest in fetal life is not implicated in
the same manner in compelled treatment cases. In the context of abortion, fetal life will cer-
tainly be terminated; this is one of the purposes of abortion. However, medical treatment
cases do not involve the purposeful termination of fetal life. Instead, they concern differ-
ences of opinion in how to achieve a live birth.”).
56. NIH VBAC Consensus Conference, supra note 2 (presenting current research on
VBAC’s safety).
57. The National Advocates for Pregnant Women (NAPW) held a student essay contest
on potential legal challenges for hospital VBAC policies. NAPW, CONGRATULATIONS TO THE
2008–2009 CONTEST WINNERS! (Oct. 22, 2009), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/main
/events/napw_writing_contest/congratulations_to_our_winners.php. See Krista Stone-
Manista, “In the Manner Prescribed By the State”: Potential Challenges to State-Enforced
Hospital Limitations on Childbirth Options, 16 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 469 (May 2010);
Elizabeth Kukura, Choice in Birth: Preserving Access to VBAC, 114 PENN ST. L. REV. 955
(2010); Paul Christopher Estaris Torio, Nature Versus Suture: Why VBAC Should Still
Be in Vogue; L. Indra Lusero, Challenging Hospital VBAC Bans Through Tort Liability:
Reasonableness and the Limits of Informed Consent, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L.
(forthcoming 2014).
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important public policy consideration when contemplating legal chal-
lenges to restrictive VBAC policies: women whom are restricted by law
from having an out-of-hospital birth are then prohibited from having
a VBAC in a hospital, the only birth setting legally available to them.
A. Hospital Policies That Prohibit VBAC
No state or federal law prohibits a woman from having a VBAC
in a hospital or with a doctor.58 Hospital policies that ban VBAC are
therefore voluntary and self-determined. Hospital VBAC refusals have
two forms: (1) the hospital has a formal policy that does not permit a
woman to have a VBAC in their hospital and prohibit doctors who
have privileges there from attending a VBAC59 or, (2) the hospital may
not have a formal policy on VBAC, but all of the doctors who have
privileges at the hospital refuse to attend VBAC patients.60 The origin
of the policy may be different, but the result is the same: no access to
hospital care for those women who desire a VBAC.61
In 2009, to determine how widespread these policies were, the
International Cesarean Awareness Network (ICAN) conducted a tele-
phone survey of 2,875 hospitals.62 Their survey found that only 1,645
hospitals allowed VBAC, 824 prohibited VBAC formally, and 388 did
not have even one doctor willing to support a VBAC, thus creating a
de facto ban.63 The survey conducted by ICAN did not identify hospi-
tals that affirmatively encourage VBAC,64 and the results should not
be interpreted to support that conclusion. The survey focused on fa-
cility level policy, therefore, a hospital was included in the “allowed”
58. ICAN Hospital Survey, supra note 7.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. The National Institutes of Health convened a consensus conference in 2006 on the
issue of maternal request cesareans. Advocates and researchers disputed the idea that
women were asking for this procedure. When the NIH panel was questioned on what data
they were basing the conclusion that women were in fact the driving force behind cesareans
without any indications, the panelists could not state one specific study. The conference un-
intentionally highlighted a concerning trend: if women are not demanding elective cesar-
eans over a VBAC then there must be some external factor that is forcing that decision.
Thanks to ICAN’s survey, we know that hospital and doctor policies are one external factor.
Video, NIH State-of-the-Science Conference: Cesarean Delivery on Maternal Request, NAT’L
INST. OF HEALTH (Mar. 27–29, 2006), http://consensus.nih.gov/2006/cesarean.htm (follow
hyperlink Archived Videocasts Day 1, Day 2, and Day 3) (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
62. ICAN’s telephone survey was designed to simulate what a pregnant woman would
be told if she contacted the hospital and asked their policy on VBAC. Industry surveys show
a slightly lower rate (one-third) of hospitals no longer offering VBAC. See ICAN Hospital
Survey, supra note 7.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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category even if only one doctor there would permit a VBAC.65 In total,
1,212 hospitals, or forty-two percent, prohibit VBAC.66
B. Midwifery Laws and Regulations That Prohibit or Restrict VBAC
The significant impediment for women seeking VBAC caused by
the number of hospitals limiting or prohibiting VBAC is further
exacerbated by heightened regulation in recent years of midwifery
practice.67 States have the authority to license midwives and promul-
gate rules under which they must practice.68 In doing so, many states
have restricted or entirely prohibited midwives from providing care
to women who have had a prior cesarean.69 A survey of state laws
and regulations conducted by the author reveals how many states pro-
hibit or restrict access to VBAC at home with direct-entry midwives.70
Only five states have no restrictions on women seeking home birth
for VBACs (Delaware,71 Tennessee,72 Minnesota,73 New York,74 and
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. ISSUE BRIEF: CERTIFIED PROFESSIONAL MIDWIVES IN THE UNITED STATES 3
(Midwives Alliance of North America 2008), available at http://mana.org/pdfs/CPMIssue
Brief.pdf.
68. It is an important distinction to note that laws restricting access to home birth mid-
wives are restricting the midwife’s scope of practice and not a woman’s right to give birth
at home. A midwife cannot practice outside the scope of her licensing regulations, but a
woman who hires a midwife is not breaking any law, even if the midwife is acting outside
the scope of her practice. Some states have included informed refusal clauses affirming
parents’ right to refuse treatment. Although these clauses may permit the parents to refuse
treatment or procedures the midwife is required to perform (a right they already possess),
it does not permit the midwife to practice outside of her scope of practice. See id.
69. This Article examines licensing laws for direct-entry midwives who are considered
experts on out of hospital birth. ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 67, at 2–3 (stating Certified Pro-
fessional Midwives have “particular expertise in out of hospital settings”). According to the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 73 percent of home births were attended by non-nurse
or direct-entry midwives, only 27 percent by CNMs, 7.6 percent by physicians, and the re-
maining births were attended by family or others. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, TRENDS
AND CHARACTERISTICS OF HOME AND OTHER OUT-OF-HOSPITAL BIRTHS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1990–2006 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr58/nvsr58
_11.pdf.
70. The purpose of this research is to provide facility level data on policies that restrict
access for women who desire a VBAC. To that end, I did not survey individual midwives to
determine their personal policy. Instead, I researched state laws and regulations governing
a midwife’s ability to accept VBACs or not. In addition to state laws that prohibit or restrict
midwives from attending VBAC, some midwives choose not to attend VBACs, however, it
is beyond the scope of this Article to determine the actual number of midwives who do or
do not attend VBACs.
71. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 122 (2011); 16-4000–4106 DEL. CODE REGS. § 4.3
(LexisNexis 2013).
72. TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-29-101 (2013); TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 1050-5-.02 (2013).
73. MINN. STAT. § 147D.01 (2013).
74. N.Y. EDUC. L. § 6951 (2012); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 79-5, tit. 10,
§ 85.36 (2013).
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Washington75). Four states prohibit VBAC in home births (Alaska,76
Arizona,77 Arkansas,78 and South Carolina79). Sixteen states impose
restrictions that limit or prohibit VBAC, such as requiring an en-
hanced informed consent process,80 a physician consult,81 at least
eighteen months between pregnancies,82 or limiting it to secondary
VBACs.83 (California,84 Colorado,85 Florida,86 Idaho,87 Louisiana,88
Montana,89 New Hampshire,90 New Jersey,91 New Mexico,92 Oregon,93
75. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.50.003 (West 2011); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 246-834
-010 (2013).
76. ALASKA STAT. § 08.65.140(d)(15) (2011).
77. ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R9-16-108(A)(1) (2013).
78. 007-13-92 ARK. CODE R. § 406.1(1) (LexisNexis 2008).
79. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-89-60(1) (2011) (stating the licensed midwife may provide
care to low-risk women). “It is the Department’s position that the care of patients de-
siring VBAC is not low-risk and therefore is outside the scope of practice for Licensed
Midwives.” Letter from South Carolina’s Department of Health and Environmental Control
(DHEC) . . . to Licensed Midwives (Mar. 27, 2006), available at http://www.scdhec.gov
/health/licen/vbac-lmw20060327.pdf.
80. An enhanced informed consent process can include signing an acknowledgement of
increased risks, providing the client with ACOG’s VBAC guidelines, information on physi-
cians to whom the client could transfer care, or current medical research on risks and ben-
efits of VBAC and documenting the process in the client’s chart. This level of disclosure is
generally not required for other conditions that may pose an increased risk, and creates
an additional burden on the midwife to uniquely document the informed consent process
for VBAC.
81. On its face, statutes requiring a doctor consultation, collaboration, or sign-off
clauses appear to allow VBAC, but there are very few doctors who will provide these con-
sultations, effectively reducing or eliminating access for women seeking VBACs. See Rhode
Island: Status of Midwifery, CITIZENS FOR MIDWIFERY (2005), http://cfmidwifery.org/states
/states.aspx?ST=RI (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (describing how changes to the Rhode
Island midwifery law that required consultation with a doctor limited midwives’ ability
to practice).
82. IDAPA 24.26.01, “Rules of the Idaho Board of Midwifery.” r.356.02(b)(i), 356.04(b)
(2010).
83. A “secondary VBAC” is a VBAC after a woman has previously had a success-
ful VBAC.
84. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 16, § 1379.19 (2010).
85. 4 COLO. CODE REGS. § 739-1:12 (LexisNexis 2011).
86. Florida has a unique point system for assessing risk criteria. When a client’s risk
factor adds up to three, the midwife is required to refer the client to a physician for a con-
sultation and sign off. If a woman has had a prior cesarean and has never had a vaginal de-
livery the risk score is three points; if she has had a VBAC previously the risk score is two
points. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 64B24-7.004 (2011).
87. IDAPA 24.26.01, “Rules of the Idaho Board of Midwifery.” r. 356.02(b)(i), 356.04(b)
(3-29-10); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 54-5501(i)(5) (2012).
88. LA. ADMIN. CODE tit. 46, § 5361(B)(1) (2013).
89. MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.111.612 (2013).
90. N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. ANN. MID. 503.02, 503.04–05 (2013).
91. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:35-2A.9 (2011).
92. N.M. CODE R. § 16.11.3.3(A) (LexisNexis 2001); PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR NEW
MEXICO MIDWIVES 2008 EDITION 88, 93, 95 (New Mexico Midwives Assoc. ed. 2008), avail-
able at http://www.health.state.nm.us/PHD/midwife/NMMA%202008%20practice%20guide
lines.pdf.
93. OR. ADMIN. R. 332-025-0021 (2013).
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Texas,94 Utah,95 Vermont,96 Virginia,97 Wisconsin,98 and Wyoming99).
The remaining states100 do not license home birth midwives.101
Unlike hospital policies, restrictions limiting VBACs in home
birth settings are laws. Despite the presumptive public policy justi-
fication to promote the welfare of citizens, there is no evidence that
prohibiting VBAC at home promotes safer conditions for mothers pre-
ferring a VBAC.102 These restrictions have the paradoxical effect of
creating greater risks for pregnant women. If the servicing hospital
prohibits VBAC, and the state places limitations on VBAC for mid-
wifery assisted births, women either submit to cesarean surgery or
pursue VBAC with no choice in care providers.103 Policy makers need
to reevaluate the scheme under which midwives can legally practice
without unnecessarily limiting VBAC, and to amend current laws to
eliminate restrictions.
C. Birth Center Laws, Regulations, and Policies Against VBAC
Similarly, policy and legal restrictions on birth center environ-
ments significantly restrict, or eliminate, a woman’s ability to choose
a VBAC. Birth centers’ VBAC policies were evaluated by both re-
searching state law and conducting a survey similar to ICAN’s hos-
pital survey. Birth center policy for VBAC is influenced both by state
law and by institutional or provider preferences.104 Some states
94. 22 TEX. ADMIN. CODE §§ 831.52, 831.60(b)(9), (c)(8) (2013).
95. UTAH ADMIN. CODE R. 58-77-204(4)(b)(v)–(ix) (2011).
96. 04-030-360 VT. CODE R. § 3.14.2.1 (2012).
97. VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2957.9(IV) (2009).
98. WIS. ADMIN. CODE RL § 182.02 (2011).
99. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-46-103(j)(i)(A)(V), (C)(II) (2011).
100. Alabama, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and
West Virginia. Indiana passed a licensing law in 2013, but at the time of publication, the
rules were not promulgated, therefore, the author was unable to determine if VBAC was
permitted. IND. CODE § 25-23.4-6-1 (2013).
101. Some states do not license direct-entry midwives. In most of the states that do not
license midwives, direct-entry midwifery is not legal because it violates the state’s medical
practice act. However, some states provide for an exemption to the medical practice act for
midwifery, making the practice legal, but they do not promulgate regulations to govern the
practice of those midwives. In either case, there is no specific restriction on VBAC and
those states were not included in the analysis. Whether or not midwifery is legal in states
that do not license direct-entry midwives is beyond the scope of this Article.
102. Amy V. Haas, Homebirth after Cesarean: The Myth and the Reality, MIDWIFERY
TODAY (2008), http://www.midwiferytoday.com/articles/homebirthaftercesarean.asp.
103. Freeze, supra note 9, at 11.
104. Jen Kamel, Is VBAC Illegal? Is Homebirth Illegal?, VBAC FACTS, http://vbacfacts
.com/2009/02/28/is-vbac-illegal/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
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prohibit VBAC under the birth center licensing laws.105 The author
conducted an email survey of birth centers to determine how many
offer VBAC in the states that do not prohibit VBAC in birth centers.106
The survey consisted of one simple question: “Do you offer VBAC at
your birth center?”, with four possible answer choices: (A) “No,” (B)
“Yes, in the birth center,” (C) “Yes, in the hospital,” (D) “Yes, at home.”
Respondents could choose more than one answer, if, for example, they
offered VBAC in the hospital and in the birth center they could choose
response “B” and response “C”. The answer choices were designed to
isolate births that actually take place in the birth centers, because
many birth center midwives will also attend deliveries at home or in
hospitals. For deliveries that take place in locations outside of the
birth center, home birth laws or hospital policies control whether the
midwife could attend a VBAC. The survey assumes that birth cen-
ters in states that prohibit VBAC do not, in fact, offer VBAC in their
centers, and were automatically classified as “prohibited.” The survey
was emailed to 227 birth centers, and the following are the results:
thirty-eight responded (B) “Yes, in the birth center”; twenty-eight
responded (A) “No”; sixty-three were prohibited by law; fifty-four did
not respond; and forty-three email addresses were returned as un-
deliverable.107 In total, only twenty-nine percent of birth centers sur-
veyed offer VBAC. The findings reveal that the trend to restrict VBAC
in hospital and home birth settings is paralleled in birth centers. With
significant restrictions in many jurisdictions against VBAC in all birth
setting options, it means that women seeking VBAC are effectively
prohibited from having the option to pursue VBAC, and must either
submit to a repeat cesarean or opt to not seek prenatal and birth care
from a health care provider.
III. THE CHILLING EFFECT VBAC BANS HAVE ON WOMEN’S RIGHTS
Hospital policies prohibiting VBAC have a chilling effect108 on a
pregnant woman’s medical rights. Women anticipating birth in a
105. Id.
106. These policies can be affected by local hospital policy or the policy of the collaborat-
ing physician. As there does not seem to be a pattern of birth center policy corresponding
with hospital policy, some midwives who responded to the survey stated that they did not
offer VBAC anymore because their collaborating physician or the hospital to which they
would transfer did not allow it. This information was volunteered in addition to the survey
response, however, and was not part of the survey. Similarly, the factors that drive birth
center policies are beyond the scope of this Article.
107. Survey results are on file with author.
108. In First Amendment legal doctrine, a “chilling effect” is “when any behavior safe-
guarded by the Constitution is unduly discouraged.” Frank Schauer, Fear, Risk and the
First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling Effect, 58 B.U.L. REV. 689, 690 (1978).
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hospital prohibiting VBAC are often unaware of their right to refuse
the surgery, or they do not know how to assert those rights.109 Prior to
widespread polices prohibiting VBAC, some hospitals attempted to
force women to have cesareans by court order.110 After a favorable ap-
pellate ruling for women’s rights, the efforts to use this legal strategy
subsided and hospitals abandoned this approach in favor of internal
policies prohibiting VBAC. Though these policies are likely not legally
enforceable,111 they persist because of the unequal bargaining positions
of the doctor-patient relationship, and through the use of coercion
and intimidation.112
The imbalance in the doctor-patient relationship is a significant
factor impacting women’s rights in birth choices, and an important
reason why informed consent is such a critical component in the de-
livery of health care. The doctor-patient relationship is an asymmet-
rical one, with the doctor in the position of authority as the one who
holds the special knowledge and skills the patient needs or wants.113
It is this “competence gap” that tips the power in the physician’s favor,
and without balanced informed consent, requires the patient to acqui-
esce to the doctor’s recommendations.114 The problem is that, even if
women are given information on alternatives, when a hospital adopts
a policy to eliminate VBAC there is often nowhere else to seek care,
except from another hospital or doctor who will require a cesarean
section.115 In these situations where a hospital prohibits VBAC, the
woman appears to be consenting to surgery, but this consent is given
109. Jen Kamel, Options for Mom Who Will Be “Forced” to Have a Repeat Cesarean,
VBAC FACTS, http://vbacfacts.com/2012/03/02/options-mom-forced-repeat-cs/ (last visited
Nov. 3, 2013); Jen Kamel, VBAC Bans, Exercising Your Rights, and When to Contact an
Attorney, VBAC FACTS, http://vbacfacts.com/2012/08/24/vbac-bans-exercising-your-rights
-and-when-to-contact-an-attorney/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (featuring a question from
a reader questioning what her rights are to refuse a cesarean); Lisa Pratt, Conference
Presentation at the National VBAC summit: A Legal Guide to VBAC: Rights, Effective
Communication, and Remedies (Aug. 18, 2011), available at https://www.dropbox.com/sh
/ps4p2crkz22kqe9/EgyojNUtdE?n=18138270 (speaking on a woman’s right to refuse treat-
ment and how to effectively assert those rights).
110. Rhoden, supra note 49, at 1951.
111. See NAPW, supra note 57, at 1; Stone-Manista, supra note 57, at 477; Kukura,
supra note 57, at 999; Torio, supra note 57, at 19; Lusero, supra note 57, at 3.
112. Susan Irwin & Brigitte Jordan, Knowledge, Practice, and Power: Court-Ordered
Cesarean Sections, 1 MED. ANTHROPOLOGY Q. 319, 319–34, (1987) (discussing forced cesar-
eans “stem from a particular definition of authoritative medical knowledge—in this in-
stance, the technical skills attributed to obstetricians that legitimate their control of
birthing and discredit the individual and collective expertise of birthing women.”).
113. Id. at 319.
114. Lu-in Wang, Race as Proxy: Situational Racism and Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 1013, 1097 (2004).
115. See Szabo, supra note 8 (stating that the woman traveled hundreds of miles to a
hospital that would permit VBAC).
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under extreme duress.116 The choice posed to a woman is that she
either has surgery or she goes without care. But few women want to
give birth without any medical care.117 Some women will navigate
around hospital policies and choose an out of hospital birth in order to
have a VBAC.
Laura Pemberton is an example of a woman attempting to navi-
gate a VBAC ban by seeking care outside of the hospital system, and
highlights how in-hospital policies affect women even when they
choose to opt out of that system.118 She had planned a home birth after
a previous cesarean, but during her labor she became dehydrated and
went to the hospital to get IV fluids. Once at the hospital, she was
denied the fluids she needed unless she agreed to have a cesarean
surgery, which she refused.119 The hospital was granted an order for
her to be returned to the hospital by police force and submit to the
operation.120 This trial level decision appears to be an outlier; if the
case had been properly appealed, it is likely the Florida court would
have followed the persuasive authority of In re A.C.121
Relatively few cases of court ordered cesareans have been pub-
lished, even fewer involve a woman with a prior cesarean refusing a
repeat surgery. After the In re A.C. decision, doctors and hospitals
stopped pursuing court-ordered cesareans and now attempt to gain
compliance in more covert ways. Rather than involving the court to
compel the doctor’s orders, they have resorted to coercion to wear
down the woman until she relents.122 Women have been threatened
that the doctor will report her to Child Protective Services (CPS) if she
did not agree to a cesarean.123 For example, a woman from Florida
posted to an email forum looking for advice after her doctor informed
her he would call CPS if she did not schedule a cesarean, or if she did
116. Laura Pemberton, Speech at the National Summit to Ensure the Health and
Humanity of Pregnant and Birthing Women (Jan. 20, 2007), available at http://vimeo.com
/4895023. The hospital withheld critical IV fluids she needed for dehydration, unless she
consented to a cesarean. She refused and left without receiving any treatment.
117. See Freeze, supra note 9, at 8–9 (estimating the number of unassisted births in the
U.S. to be between a few hundred and 8000, but due to the “off-grid” nature of unassisted
births, the number is difficult to estimate).
118. See Pemberton, supra note 116; see also Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1249 (N.D. Fla. 1999).
119. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.
120. Torio, supra note 57.
121. Laura Pemberton’s Talk From NAPW’s 2007 Summit Now Available Online, NAPW,
http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/featured/laura_pembertons_talk_from_napws_2007
_summit_now_available_online.php (last updated July 6, 2009) (commenting on the
Pemberton case).
122. See Pemberton, supra note 116.
123. Informed Consent in Childbirth: Making Rights into Reality, IMPROVINGBIRTH.ORG
(July 9, 2013), http://www.improvingbirth.org/2013/07/informed-consent-in-childbirth/.
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not show up for the scheduled surgery.124 More recently, a woman con-
tacted popular blogger Jen Kamel at VBACFacts.com looking for ad-
vice after her doctor threatened to drop her from care if she did not
consent to a cesarean. With Ms. Kamel’s help, she contacted several
advocacy groups who were able to convince the doctor and hospital to
back down without court intervention.125
A recent decision in New Jersey highlights this egregious method
taken to an extreme.126 While in labor, V.M. refused to sign a blanket
consent form for a cesarean, even though there was no indication she
needed one, and a psychologist was called in to evaluate her mental
condition.127 The psychologist who examined her concluded she was
competent and entitled to informed consent.128 Not content with the
first psychologist’s conclusion, the hospital brought in a second doctor
to evaluate V.M.129 The interview was cut short when V.M. vaginally
delivered her baby. Despite the competent evaluation from the first
doctor and the fact that she delivered a healthy baby without the re-
fused surgery, CPS was called in to investigate, based on her refusal
to submit to the surgery.130 Ultimately V.M. prevailed, a victory for
pregnant woman but bittersweet for V.M., who was needlessly sepa-
rated from her baby for four years while the case was adjudicated.131
It is this type of case that presents a chilling effect on women’s rights
in child birth. Even when a woman knows her rights, she will abandon
her rights rather than risk having her baby removed after a retalia-
tory CPS investigation.
This decision touches on an important public policy consideration:
punishing a woman for not agreeing to a recommended treatment,
particularly major surgery,132 will only discourage women from seek-
ing medical care. Prenatal care is vital to a healthy pregnancy.133
124. Postings of Lily Beck (July 24, 2009 & Aug. 14, 2009) (on file with author).
125. See Kamel, Options, supra note 109, at 5; see also Kamel, VBAC Bans, supra note
109, at 2.
126. See Jessica L. Waters, In Whose Best Interest? New Jersey Division of Youth and
Family Services v. V.M. & B.G. and the Next Wave of Court-Controlled Pregnancies, 34
HARV. J. L. & GENDER 81, 82 (2011); see also N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.M. (In
re Guardianship of J.M.G.), Nos. A-2649-08T4, 10 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div., Aug. 6, 2010)
(per curiam), available at http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/FGopinion.pdf.
127. Waters, supra note 126, at 84.
128. Id. at 85.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 86.
131. Superior Court of New Jersey has ruled in favor of V.M., NAT’L ADVOC. FOR
PREGNANT WOMEN (Aug. 6, 2010), advocatesforwomen.org/blog/2010/08/post.php.
132. Waters, supra note 126, at 111.
133. AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY DELIVERY 6 (2010), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org
/sites/default/files/pdfs/deadlydelivery.pdf (“Women who do not receive prenatal care are
three to four times more likely to die [of pregnancy-related complications] than women
who do.”).
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States should support policies that encourage women to seek this im-
portant care, not create barriers and disincentives for accessing it.
Women do not choose VBAC for safety reasons only, and these other
factors are a pertinent piece of why VBAC should not be prohibited.134
And yet, paradoxically, safety should be of utmost concern for ex-
pecting women, especially in a hospital setting. According to a recent
Amnesty International report, the United States has a worse maternal
mortality rate than forty other industrialized nations.135 African
American women have a much higher mortality and morbidity rate,
as well as higher cesarean rates and lower VBAC rates, than other
racial and ethnic groups.136 This already vulnerable population is
even more affected by such policies.137 With this in mind, unlike coun-
tries where women do not have adequate nutrition and give birth in
areas with poor sanitation and limited or no access to health care, the
United States still has a relatively low number of maternal deaths.138
Although the maternal death rate in this country is higher than it
should be, it is not high enough to justify eviscerating the medical
rights of pregnant women by forcing them into unwanted procedures
under the guise of increased safety.
CONCLUSION
It is often stated that “all that matters is a healthy mom and
healthy baby.” This oversimplification does a disservice to women
and babies. A healthy outcome is the goal, but how we achieve the de-
sired results is really what matters. It matters that all women are
treated with respect and dignity during labor. To insure integrity in
the process, women must be full participants in their pregnancies,
anything less would undermine informed consent, and compromise
134. See Lyerly & Little, supra note 20, at 341 (discussing extramedical reasons women
consider in choosing between VBAC and an elective repeat cesarean).
135. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 133, at 1 (stating the U.S. has higher maternal mortality
rates than 40 other industrialized countries and estimating the rate could be double the
published rate due to no requirements for hospitals to report maternal deaths).
136. Margaret Harper et al., Racial Disparity In Pregnancy-Related Mortality Following
A Live Birth Outcome, 14 ANNALS OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 274, 278 (2004); Susan Gennaro,
Overview Of Current State Of Research On Maternity Outcomes In Minority Populations,
192 AM. J. OF OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY S3, S4 (2005); Camara Phyllis Jones, Levels Of
Racism: A Theoretic Framework and a Gardener’s Tale, 90 AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH 1212,
1212 (2000); Michael Lu, Racial And Ethnic Disparities In Birth Outcomes: A Life-Course
Perspective, 7 MATERNAL AND CHILD HEALTH J. 13, 13 (2003).
137. Jones, supra note 136, at 1212.
138. PREGNANCY-RELATED DEATHS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (2013),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/pregnancy
-relatedmortality.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (stating there are approximately 650
pregnancy-related maternal deaths per year in the U.S.).
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the manner in which we attain the stated goal. Everyone agrees that
healthy moms and healthy babies are important, but that goal must
be carried out in a manner that acknowledges that the process is as
important as the end result.
Prohibitions on VBAC are generating a public health crisis. A
record-high cesarean rate coupled with the lack of available VBAC
options puts a burden on the healthcare system, puts women at un-
necessary risk, and limits patient choice. Putting profits and the
desire for liability protection over women’s health is not adequate
justification to reduce women’s rights in pregnancy. In addition to
changing hospital policies, a change is needed to laws for home birth
and birth centers to remove barriers and prohibitions to VBAC.
